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Abstract
Who bears responsibility for the financial crisis? The list of possible culprits is unmanageably long and at
times internally inconsistent, as it includes subprime mortgages and over-zealous mortgage originators; risk-
happy investment bankers and the ineffectual ratings agents who rubber-stamped the bankers' exotic
products; and neoconservatives hell-bent on deregulation along with liberal politicians cowering before
entities they allowed to become too big to fail.1 Nonetheless the question of responsibility seems to demand
an answer not only for purposes of arriving at lessons that might avert a future crisis but also for answering a
second question that seems a natural corollary of the first—viz., who bears responsibility for funding the
bailouts necessitated by the financial crisis? More specifically, who in the United States bears responsiblity for
funding the bailouts undertaken by the U.S. government?
Disciplines
Banking and Finance Law | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance | Economic
Policy | Finance | Finance and Financial Management | Law | Legal Studies | Organizational Behavior and
Theory | Real Estate
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/60
Responsibility, Repair and Redistribution in the
Wake of the Financial Crisis
AMY J. SEPINWALL*
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 301
1. UNCONVINCING EFFORTS To EXCULPATE WALL STREET .......... 303
11. MAIN STREET SEEKS EASY STREET ........................ 307
III. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY To BAIL OUT ..................... 308
IV. BAILING AND FLAIING ................................ 312
CONCLUSION ............................................. 314
INTRODUCTION
Who bears responsibility for the financial crisis? The list of possible culprits
is unmanageably long and at times internally inconsistent, as it includes subprime
mortgagees and over-zealous mortgage originators; risk-happy investment bank-
ers and the ineffectual ratings agents who rubber-stamped the bankers' exotic
products; and neoconservatives hell-bent on deregulation along with liberal
politicians cowering before entities they allowed to become too big to fail.'
* Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Wharton, University of
Pennsylvania. B.A., McGill University, 1997; M.A., McGill University, 1999; J.D., Yale Law School,
2004; Ph.D., Philosophy, Georgetown University, 2010. For very helpful comments and suggestions, I
am grateful to participants in the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics' symposium,
"The Ethics of Bailouts and Government Support of Corporations: Public Benefit or Crony Capital-
ism?," especially to Jason Brennan and John Hasnas. And, for excellent research assistance, I am
indebted to Jonelle Lesniak. @ 2013, Amy J. Sepinwall.
1. See, e.g., Eli Lehrer, Subprime Borrowers: Not Innocents: Pro: Willing Customers, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2008/03/subprime
borrowersnotinnocents.html#share ("A simple look at the blunt reality reveals that borrowers them-
selves should assume primary responsibility for the current subprime crisis. Millions of borrowers, all
over the country, knowingly signed mortgage contracts they cannot now afford to honor."); George
Benston, Subprime Borrowers: Not Innocents: Con: Collaborative Fiasco, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Mar. 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2008/03/subprime borrowersnot_
innocents.html#share ("the mortgage salespeople and real-estate brokers who both misled borrowers
and falsified the applications to get mortgages the borrowers could not repay . .. should be pros-
ecuted."); Leslie Marshall, Greed Caused the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Not ACORN, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORTr (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/10/16/greed-caused-the-
subprime-mortgage-crisis-not-acorn; Lesson One: What Really Lies Behind the Financial Crisis?,
KNOWLEDGE@ WHARTON (Jan. 21, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle.cfm?articleid=2148
(describing Jeremy Siegel's comments blaming the crisis on financial firms on Wall Street that held
large quantities of risky, mortgage-related assets on borrowed money); Rachelle Younglai & Sarah N.
Lynch, Credit Raters Triggered Financial Crisis: Panel, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2011 (describing a Senate
report blaming the ratings agencies for unduly inflating the ratings of mortgage-backed securities);
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Nonetheless the question of responsibility seems to demand an answer not only
for purposes of arriving at lessons that might avert a future crisis but also for
answering a second question that seems a natural corollary of the first-viz.,
who bears responsibility for funding .the bailouts necessitated by the financial
crisis? More specifically, who in the United States bears responsibility for
funding the bailouts undertaken by the U.S. government?
To the extent that the question of responsibility for funding the bailout tracks
all and only those individuals and entities that culpably precipitated the crisis,
the question is misguided. I want to argue that the answer to the question of
responsibility for funding the bailout is broader than typically thought, and this
is so in two respects. First, while commentators are inclined to focus on
culpable constituents-like bankers, regulators, lenders and borrowers-I shall
contend that one can locate blameworthiness, and so liability to pay, in large
swaths of the American public, which embraced an ethos of easy money that
fundamentally fueled much of the reckless speculating that caused the collapse.
Second, even though many Americans did not find themselves caught up in the
easy money ethos, all Americans may be made to pay, just in virtue of their
shared membership in the polity that allowed the crisis to occur. The central
claim of this paper is, then, that we may justify Main Street's bailing out of Wall
Street on a theory of shared responsibility that has been overlooked.
On the other hand, the very theory that would justify widespread responsibil-
ity for crisis clean up also justifies widespread responsibility to rectify numer-
ous other social and economic ills. There are clearly compelling practical
reasons for which the crisis bailout has received priority, chief among which is
the widespread devastation that would have been wrought were our economy to
have collapsed.2 Nonetheless, we need not blithely defer rectification of these
other social and economic ills in favor of the bailout efforts. Instead, their
existence might guide or condition the distribution of bailout obligations, as I
Paul Krugman, Reagan Did It, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1, 2011 at Al (blaming deregulation during the Reagan
era); Mark Gongloff, Romney's Dodd-Frank Comments Shock Bewildered Bankers, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/dodd-frank-kiss-banks-b_1939484.
html ("This canard, that Dodd-Frank essentially sets 'too big to fail' in stone forever, is one of
Republicans' favorite arguments against Dodd-Frank"). See generally Susanne Craig & Ben Protess,
Everyone Was To Blame, Crisis Commission Finds, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2011), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/everyone-was-to-blame-crisis-commission-finds/.
2. This is a contested view of the need for the bailout. The government sought to press the case
that economic meltdown would have resulted had the bailout not occurred. See, e.g., Bush: Bailout
Plan Necessary To Deal with Crisis, CNN.com (Sept. 24, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-24/
politics/bush.bailoutI_-bailout-proposal-rescue-plan-mortgage-related-securities?_s=PM:POLITICS;
cf Martin Crutsinger, Economists See Financial Bailout As Necessary, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20,
2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/21/economists-see-financial-_n_128029.html. On the
other hand, others believe that no such collapse would have occurred. See, e.g., Dean Baker, Was the
Bank Bailout Necessary?, THE GUARDIAN (May 18, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis
free/cifamerica/2009/may/18/us-economy-bank-bailout; cf James K. Galbraith, A Bailout We Don't
Need, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.conwp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/24/
AR2008092403033.html (arguing that once the big five banks had been rescued, the bailout was no
longer necessary).
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argue in the last part of the paper.
By arguing that the American public as a whole bears responsibility for the
crisis, I do not mean to absolve key players in the financial industry from blame.
Yet much of the scholarship produced in the wake of the crisis seeks to do just
this. I begin, then, in Part I, by critiquing some of the explanations for the
financial crisis proffered by others, not because these misidentify the crisis's
causal contributions but instead because they misconstrue the moral nature of
these contributions. In Part II, I turn to a more encompassing account of
responsibility for the financial crisis, which seeks to draw out the ways in which
many lay investors-ordinary people, not opportunistic borrowers, or predatory
lenders, or Wall Street gurus-bear responsibility for the crisis, in light of their
having invited, and perhaps even demanded, excessive risk-taking on the part of
their financial advisors. Part III seeks to extend the account of responsibility
further, by arguing that even those Americans who handled their money with the
utmost of prudence may be made to contribute to the bailout funds. While
Part III thereby seeks to articulate a ground upon which to hold the American
people as a whole responsible for funding the bailout, Part IV argues that we
may not insist upon this ground without also insisting that the populace attend
to other social and economic ills. The bailout, that is, necessitates and should be
accompanied by, an effort to reduce existing inequalities in wealth. Part V
concludes.
I. UNCONVINCING EFFORTS To EXCULPATE WALL STREET
A course of reading on the financial crisis reveals a curious asymmetry in our
responses to Wall Street and government, respectively. Both are reported to
have failed spectacularly but, in the case of Wall Street, the failure is seen as an
expected lapse while, in the case of government, it is seen as a calamitous
disappointment.3 In this Part, I seek to examine the arguments that might
underpin this asymmetry, and argue that there is something problematic about
each one.
How might one defend the claim that Wall Street, though undoubtedly
causally responsible for the crisis, nonetheless bears little moral responsibility
for it? One can glean from the literature four possible lines of defense.
First, there is the "Wall Street couldn't help itself" defense. Thus, Richard
Posner argues that, "although the financiers bear the primary responsibility for
the depression, I do not think they can be blamed for it .. . any more than one
3. See, e.g., Mark J. Perry & Robert Dell, How Government Failure Caused the Great Recession,
THE AMERICAN: THE ONuINE MAG. OF THE AM. ENTER. INST. (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.american.com/
archive/2010/december/how-govemment-failure-caused-the-great-recession; John B. Taylor, How Gov-
ernment Created the Financial Crisis: Research Shows the Failure To Rescue Lehman Did Not Trigger
the Fall Panic, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl23414310280561945.htmi;
Charles Calomiris, Calomiris on the Financial Crisis, LIBRARY OF EcON. & LIBERTY (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2009/Calomirisfinancial.mp3.
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can blame a lion for eating a zebra."4 In a similar vein, other commentators
have portrayed traders as "intoxicated,"' or beset by "animal spirits," 6 or
genetically compelled to squander other people's money for their own advan-
tage.7 It is unsurprising, then, that for Posner, as well as many others, the lion's
share of blame resides with government, for its failure to constrain financial
players who cannot be counted on to constrain themselves.
The view of human agency underlying the "Wall Street couldn't help itself
defense" is deeply cynical and deeply unappealing, and I think that we have
good reason to resist it. We do not, after all, readily excuse others who are
swayed by circumstance to engage in wrongdoing-those who commit crimes
as a result of desperate economic circumstances, for example. If Wall Street has
engaged in wrongdoing, it is not at all clear that its players should be entitled to
any more leniency. And even to the extent that we reduce blame in cases where
an offender has acted in the heat of passion, the kind of passion motivating
these criminal offenses is of a vastly different quality from that characterizing
Wall Street's purported intoxication, which persisted for multiple years and
from which at least some bankers seem to have been immune.
A second possible line of defense goes to the fungibility of financial players.
The thought here is "if I don't, someone else will: If I don't originate the NINJA
loan, sell the over-rated CDO, under-capitalize my firm, and so on, someone
else will. If the outcome is the same no matter what I do, why should I abstain
and let someone else reap the rewards?" Thus Chuck Prince, former CEO of
Citigroup, exhorted: "As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and
dance."9
This argument rests upon the crudest of consequentialist accounts. For one
thing, how can any of us be certain that a refusal to participate won't have
signaling effects that lead others to refuse as well? Moreover, even if it were the
case that the outcome would be the same no matter what, one might take the
nonconsequentialist view, that one is judged for what one does, and not for the
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION
284 (2009).
5. Thus George W. Bush famously stated that Wall Street got "drunk." See, e.g., Henry J. Pulizzi, On
Economy, Bush Faults "Drunk" Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 23, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 121676977361275349.html.
6. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER & GEORGE A. AKERLOF, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009).
7. See, e.g., The Molecules of Mayhem: Testosterone and Taking Risks, THE ECONOMIST (May 26,
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21555882 (reviewing JOHN COATES, THE HOUR BETWEEN DOG
AND WOLF: RISK-TAKING, GuT FEELINGS AND THE BIOLOGY OF BOOM AND BUST (2012)).
8. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT. INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) (profiling a
handful of investment gurus who believed-correctly and to highly profitable effect, as it turns
out-that the market was vastly over-valuing mortgage backed securities, and vastly under-estimating
their risk).
9. See, e.g., John Cassidy, What Good Is Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 29, 2010), http://
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/29/101129fa factcassidy.
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outcomes of what one does.'o
The third argument that one might invoke to absolve the financial players in
the crisis points to the relatively insignificant contribution of each one. Given
the magnitude of the losses, and the number of individuals involved-from
mortgage originators, to analysts, to traders, to ratings agents, to regulators, and
so on-it is tempting to regard the role of any one of them as negligible.
That would be a mistake. To see why, consider an argument raised in the
philosophical literature on apportioning responsibility to criminal accomplices.
Suppose that I want to push my nemesis over a cliff, but that I am not strong
enough to do so alone. I wait until the wind is blowing in the right direction and
then, only with the wind on my side, manage to give my nemesis a push with
the requisite force to pitch him over. Clearly, my responsibility is not dimin-
ished because both the wind and I were necessary to get the job done. Now
imagine that it is not the wind, but a friend, who helps me get the job done.
There is no good reason to reduce my responsibility relative to the amount of
responsibility I bear in the first case." Extending the argument, suppose now
that it is not a person but an entire edifice that is to be tossed off the cliff, and a
thousand people are required to heave it over. It follows that each of them is
responsible for the edifice's destruction, and not just for 1/ 1 0 0 0 th of its destruc-
tion. So, again, if all of the market players engaged in wrongdoing, they cannot
find refuge from blame by invoking the fact that they were joined by thousands
of others.
A final defense of Wall Street points to the failure of government regulators
to erect appropriate safeguards. On this line of argument, the deregulation of the
banking industry occurring through the 1990s and early 2000s, along with the
governmental push toward homeownership, incentivized undue risk-taking,
with the crash as the inevitable result.12 The underlying thought here is that it is
10. Anglo-American criminal law reflects the view that it is acts, and not outcomes, that matter, as
for example in cases of accomplice liability where the accomplice's contribution made no causal
difference to the crime's occurrence, see, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney General v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 734
(1894), or again in the doctrine of attempts, see generally R.A. DuFF, CRIMINAL AmTEMrs (1996); but cf
John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and Liability
for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that we should prosecute and punish
attempts only if the defendant's conduct is sufficient to cause alarm to the generic citizen who witnesses
the defendant; otherwise, given the risk of enforcement error, we should permit a defense of impos-
sibility if the defendant's failure to complete the crime arose from a mistake of law or fact, and the
defendant did not commit some other crime in the process). It can be found as well in cases of
accomplice liability where the accomplice is convicted whether or not her contribution actually made a
causal difference to the crime's occurrence. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures To Punish: Command
Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MicH. J. Iwr'L L. 251 (2009).
11. Michael Zimmerman, Sharing Responsibility, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 115 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Dwyer Gunn, A "Spasmodic, Improvisational Response": Richard Posner Tackles the
New Depression, FREAKONOMICS (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/04/14/a-spasmodic-
improvisational-response-richard-posner-tackles-the-new-depression/; Richard Posner, Capture Theory
and the Financial Crisis, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 12, 2011, 5:10 PM) http://www.bcker-posner-
blog.com/2011/06/capture-theory-and-the-financial-crisisposner.html ("I would go so far as to contend
that the government is entirely to blame for the crisis . . . .").
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the responsibility of the populace, not the banks, to enact a legal regime that
checks financiers' baser instincts and keeps moral hazard at bay. 13 Two re-
sponses are in order. First, as others have noted, Wall Street will always stay at
least one step ahead of Capitol Hill,' 4 as bankers develop creative ways to
circumvent whatever new set of regulations Congress imposes upon them. In
this way, bankers might be likened to antibiotic-resistant bacteria, forever
evolving to survive and thrive in the face of the most recent remedy intended to
thwart their progress."
Second, and more fundamentally, the argument naively presumes an amount
of popular will and power that is belied by current political practices and
structures. Of particular note here is the role of money in politics-with in-
dividuals and corporations permitted to spend unlimited amounts of money on
ads supporting political candidates who will advance their economic interests
(or ads opposing political candidates who would frustrate those interests), 16 and
lobbyists on behalf of finance, insurance, and real estate interests spending
hundreds of millions annually to curry favor with those same politicians.17 A
financially favorable feedback loop results: Those with money spend it to get
the legal regime that will allow them to earn still more money, some of which
they spend entrenching or extending the political machinery that will further
facilitate their financial objectives, and so on and so forth. The one person, one
vote conceit ceases to be meaningful where political power turns so mightily on
one's ability to influence politics through the power of one's purse. In short, it is
13. Cf Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility ofBusiness Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/1ibertarians/issues/
friedman-soc-resp-business.html (expressing the sanguine view that citizens can press for constraints
on profit-seeking activity by prevailing upon their legislators, and arguing that corporations ought to do
whatever they can within the law to maximize shareholder returns).
14. See, e.g., Nassim Nicholas Taleb, End Bonuses for Bankers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinionlend-bonuses-for-bankers.html?_r=0,; Daniel Gross, Reining in
Bubbles So They Won't Pop, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/
2009/02/27/reining-in-bubbles-so-they-won-t-pop.html. Cf Daniel Gross, Dumb Money: The villains of
the financial catastrophe aren't criminals. They're morons., SLATE.COM (Feb. 23, 2009) http://www.slate.
com/articles/business/moneybox/2009/02/dumb money.html.
15. Cf Simon Longstaff, Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis, CoRP. RESPONSIBILITY INDEX,
http://corporate-responsibility.com.au/content/articles/ethics-and-global-financial-crisis (last visited
Mar. 20, 2013) (decrying "the laissez faire jungle in which self-interest mutates into the degraded forms
of greed and selfishness").
16. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
17. For example, in 2007, lobbying expenses for the finance, insurance and real estate industries
exceeded $420 million. CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., Lobbying: Finance, Insurance & Real Estate, Sector
Profile, 2007, OPENSECRETS.ORG http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id= F&year=2007 (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012). The insurance industry, which would include entities like AIG, spent over
$139 million on lobbying in 2007; the securities and investment industry spent $86.8 million; real
estate lobbyists spent $80.9 million; and commercial banks spent $40.8 million. Id. By contrast, the
ACLU spent $4.2 million on lobbying in 2007; the National Right to Work Committee spent $1.44 mil-
lion; Consumers Union of the United States spent $484,000; and Public Citizen spent $260,000 in
2007. CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., Lobbying: Misc. Issues, Industry Profile, 2007, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=Q1O&year=2007 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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foolhardy to rely upon Main Street to rein in Wall Street given the vastly
disparate resources and clout available to each.
The foregoing might be read as an indictment of the banking industry and an
apology on behalf of the American public. In fact, the truth is more nuanced:
Both parties bear blame, I believe, and their responsibility may well be inter-
related, as I shall now argue.
II. MAIN STREET SEEKS EASY STREET
We now know that individual bankers and banks engaged in wrongful acts
that contributed to the crisis; some intended to defraud while others proceeded
with a breathtaking recklessness to similar effect.' 8 But, for many others, the
failure to appreciate and heed risk appears not to have been so much at their
own behest as in the service of their clients. The risk-taking of these players
could be deemed culpable only if in taking risks they had breached some duty
of care. But it may well be that the standard of care that the investing public
demands is so low as to not have been breached even in the trades and
investments that caused the crisis. The thought here is that Wall Street is in the
business of courting risk, and it is in the business of courting risk because the
investing public has given it that mandate.
Individuals prefer to spend rather than save,' 9 and as a result demand the kind
of financial alchemy that can transform one's house into a virtual ATM,2 0 or
18. Countrywide for example overcharged customers who were desperately hanging on to their
home loans, see, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million for
Overcharging Struggling Homeowners; Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled Loans of Borrowers in
Bankruptcy (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/countrywide.shtm, and discrimi-
nated against Black and Hispanic borrowers, see, e.g., Charlie Savage, Countrywide Will Settle A Bias
Suit, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2011, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/us-
settlement-reported-on-countrywide-lending.html. For the thought that many banks undertook undue
and excessively risky investments, see, for example, David Brooks, Greed and Stupidity, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2009, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/opinion/03brooks.html?_r=0
(describing accounts of the crisis faulting bankers for their over-confidence and failures to appreciate
risk). Moreover, wrongdoing seems to have persisted in the aftermath of the crisis, with some banks
thwarting the very relief efforts precipitated by their contributions to the housing market collapse, by
"losing paperwork" or otherwise making it unduly difficult for mortgagees to receive relief to which
they are entitled under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). See, e.g., Arthur Delaney,
Obama Housing Program Hits Milestone: 1 Million Failed Mortgage Modifications, THE HUFFINGTON
PosT (September 13, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/13/obama-housing-
hampn_1881972.html?utmhp.ref= politics; Shahien Nasiripour & Arthur Delaney, Michigan Family
Says Obama Foreclosure-Prevention Program Cost Them Their Home, THE HUFFINGToN PosT (Febru-
ary 1, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/michigan-family-says-obam-n
816684.html.
19. Cf 25 People To Blame for the Financial Public: American Consumers, TIME (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_18773501877319,00.html ("In the
third quarter of 2008, Americans began saving more and spending less. Hurrah! That only took 40 years
to happen. We've been borrowing, borrowing, borrowing-living off and believing in the wealth effect,
first in stocks, which ended badly, then in real estate, which has ended even worse.").
20. M.P. Dunleavey, It's Too Easy To Turn Home into an ATM, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/22/business/22instincts.html.
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one's exceedingly modest savings into a fiscal cushion that can sustain a long,
comfortable retirement. Thus, for example, roughly 1 in 5 Americans say they
would rather spend today than put money away for the future. 2 1 And their
preference is borne out in statistics demonstrating that whereas the average
American saved 9 percent of personal income in the 1980s, the average personal
savings rate has dropped to almost 0 percent today.22 Fund managers are willing
to oblige: They have sought out securitized products whose risks were under-
rated, in order to achieve high returns consistent with their regulatory con-
straints. Risk, then, is the inevitable price of our preferences for consumption
over savings.
These are not, in and of themselves, morally problematic preferences. But
they do foreclose an overly censorious critique of Wall Street risk-taking. Con-
tempt for greed is all too convenient when the bet turns sour if we are prepared
to countenance greed when the bet pays off. To be clear, I do not mean to
excuse any and every exercise of greed, or to endorse the pre-crisis incentive
and compensation schemes that greased Wall Street's wheels. Some abuses are
pure charlatanism, and blame for these must rest with the charlatans alone. But
the financial crisis resulted not from intentional swindling so much as the
internal logic of Wall Street itself. The investing public cannot disclaim responsi-
bility for market players' missteps when it engages in an enterprise to which it
lends both its financial and moral support.
There is then a genuine sense in which those of us who invest or borrow or
both-which is to say the vast majority of us2 3-licensed and indeed motivated
many of the schemes leading to the crisis as a result of our financial predilec-
tions. For this reason, many of us share blame for the crisis. It is then not unfair
to have those of us who are blameworthy pay to undo the damage we have
caused. But I now want to advance a more sweeping claim-that all of us share
responsibility for the crisis's cleanup efforts.
III. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY To BAIL OUT
A recurring trope in the bailout literature leverages the image of a bursting
dam: Federal money had to be diverted to the banks because the disaster that
would have occurred otherwise would have been damaging enough to drown us
21. Naxtis Global Management Survey Explores Why Many Americans Don't Save for Retirement,
BusINEssWIRE (March 21, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.comlnews/home/20120321005428/
en/Natixis-Global-Asset-Management-Survey-Explores-Americans.
22. Massimo Guidolin & Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse, The Decline in the U.S. Personal Saving Rate: Is
It Real and Is It a Puzzle?, 89 FED. REs. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 491, 491 (2007), http://research.
stlouisfed.org/publications/review/07/ ll/Guidolin.pdf.
23. Among full-time, full-year wage and salary workers ages 21-64, 54.5 percent participate in a
retirement plan. CRAIG COPELAND, EMPLOYEE BENEFrr RES. INST. EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT PLAN
PARTICIPAION: GEOGRAPHIc DIFFERENCES AND TRENDS, 2010, (2011), http://www.ebri.org/pdflbriefspdf/
EBRIIB_10-2011_No363_RetPart.pdf. In addition, 76 percent of Americans carried some form of
debt in 2008. On Borrowed Time: Living Beyond Our Means, AssocIATED PREsS, http://hosted.ap.org/
specials/interactives/_business/debt addictionlindex.html?SITE=AP (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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all.24 At the same time, many are inclined to view the wrongdoing that precipi-
tated the crisis as part and parcel of a general "crisis of ethics and values."25
The diluvian metaphor together with the indictment of all suggests that the
crisis and our compelled contributions to the bailout are justly deserved: We
together created and sustained a culture of iniquity, and a calamity of biblical
proportions was then our due. On the other hand, some fiscally responsible
citizens rage against a measure that conscripts them to remedy others' financial
irresponsibility,26 claiming that the current regime privatizes wealth while
socializing risk and the costs of recovery.2 7
As with so much of the polarized rhetoric about the crisis and bailout, the
truth here likely lies somewhere in the middle. It is certainly true that not all
Americans took advantage of easy credit or undertook excessively risky bets.
But this fact in itself does not serve to release them (us) from obligations to
fund the crisis's cleanup effort. Analogies to the wreckage from a natural
disaster are instructive here. No one of us caused, let alone culpably caused, the
destruction or devastation resulting from, say, Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy.
Nonetheless, I do not believe that we are entitled to complain when our tax
dollars go to fund the recovery efforts; instead, the associative obligations that
we owe our compatriots entail, among other things, an obligation to help
subsidize the costs of repairing the hurricanes' damage.
More specifically, and as I have argued elsewhere,28 what it is to be involved
in a polity with others is to recognize that we have special obligations to our
fellow citizens. The polity is a kind of joint project-a joint project of self-
governance-and participation in a joint project entails certain obligations of
loyalty to one's fellow members. For example, members may prevail upon each
other to act in the best interests of their joint project; they may demand that their
fellows signal their commitment to the joint project in ritualized ways; they may
expect that a member's dissatisfaction with the course of the joint project will
prompt her to seek reform rather than an immediate withdrawal from the group;
24. See, e.g., Roumeen Islam & Raj Nallari, Of Floods and Droughts: The Economic and Financial
Crisis of 2008 (The World Bank Inst. Thematic Learning Dep't, Working Paper No. 5327, Mar. 1,
2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1573450.
25. This finding emerges from a survey conducted by the World Economics Forum finding that
"two-thirds of those queried think the crunch is also a crisis of ethics and values." Tom Heneghan,
Analysis-Ethics Angle Missing in Financial Crisis Debate, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2010, 4:46 PM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/04/idINIndia-46652920100304; see also Longstaff, supra note 15
("The root cause of the problem is not a failure of regulation but of ethics.").
26. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Bailout strikes many on Main Street as unfair; Sentiment poses new
challenge to candidates this fall, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/
article/Bailout-strikes-many-on-Main-Street-as-unfair-1784439.php ("'I've been financially responsible
with my own money. Why should I now be responsible for the fact that you were not?'); Chris
Dollmetsch, Main Street Pans Bailout, Says Bankers Get 'What They Deserve', BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=a5LgXsmYi6OU&pid=newsarchive.
27. Longstaff, supra note 15 ("Having privatised the upside of economic irresponsibility, we must
now socialise the downside-all a result of a failure of ethics.").
28. Amy Sepinwall, Collective Guilt and the Reactive Attitudes, in AccouNTABLrrY FOR COLLECrIVE
WRONGDOING 231 (Richard Vernon & Tracy Isaacs eds., 2011).
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and so on. In addition to these general obligations, the particular nature of the
joint project might entail obligations specific to it. Of particular relevance here
are enhanced obligations that we come to owe our compatriots in virtue of our
shared membership in the polity-special obligations, as it were.2 9
Now, not every joint project imposes upon its members special obligations to
one another or, to the extent these do arise, they may do so indirectly: Sports
teammates may bear special obligations to help one another out in the locker
room and on the field, because doing so advances the joint project, but participa-
tion in this joint project does not immediately entail obligations of assistance off
the field and outside of the stadium. At the same time, we may anticipate that
longstanding teammates do develop the kind of thick relationships that tran-
scend the scope of the joint project, and give rise to at least some of the special
obligations of friends.
Whereas the members of a sports team need not, at least at the outset, bear
obligations to one another to promote the others' general well-being, partici-
pants in the project of self-governance incur just such special obligations
because of the nature of the joint project this is. The project of self-governance
is a scheme of social cooperation intended to make its participants better off.
Among the ways it does so is through the creation of a community of individu-
als each of whom bears obligations to the others that he or she would not, all
else being equal, bear toward outsiders. We can liken the relationship between
compatriots to that obtaining between the members of an extended family,
though likely significantly reduced in strength. So it is that we may be called
upon to help support our compatriots when large-scale phenomena for which
they bear little or no responsibility set back their interests. These obligations of
support signal and solidify our commitment to one another and affirm the value
that we attach to the joint project of self-governance together. In this way,
contributions to hurricane clean up within our polity are not mere charity-
these contributions are distinct from the money we might send to the victims of
Japan's tsunami or Haiti's earthquake. Instead, they are compelled by, and they
vindicate, our sense of being in the same boat, as it were.
But perhaps the analogy to storm wreckage is misguided. After all it is a
matter of sheer bad luck that a hurricane strikes one coast, rather than another,
or that there is a natural disaster in the first place. But the same cannot be said
about the financial crisis, which was an avoidable calamity.30 Insofar as those
who caused the crisis could have done otherwise, and thereby averted the
disaster, we might want to deny that we are obligated to help clean up their
mess.
29. See generally Talbot M. Brewer, Two Kinds of Commitment (and Two Kinds of Social Group),
66 J. PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 554, 572 (2003); Michael Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91 J. PmIL. 333
(1994); Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 189 (1997);
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrS OF JUSTICE (1982).
30. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html?_r=0.
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This way of thinking overstates the extent to which a discrete set of individu-
als can be assigned responsibility for the crisis, given the magnitude of the
devastation it wrought. It is not mere coincidence, or rhetorical flourish, or
convenient demurral that leads interested parties to cast the crisis as a perfect
storm.3 ' To be sure, many, many people acted in morally substandard ways that
brought the country to the brink of economic collapse. Castigation and perhaps
even punishment is their due. But, for the most part, the culpable contribution of
any one of them is exceedingly small relative to the magnitude of the harm that
these contributions together caused.3 2 More specifically, the moral failings of
which many are guilty-greed or improvidence or an excessive desire for
leisure-are so tantalizing and so common that few of us can claim the moral
purity that would be necessary to stand in judgment of our fellows. We may
have resisted here but have we not succumbed on other occasions? And isn't it
sheer moral luck that has made it the case that our own descents into these vices
didn't produce the devastating consequences of the financial crisis? Or, even if
we have avoided these vices, are we so righteous as to have refrained from
others, no less culpable? In short, the amount of blame properly attributable to
the culpable players is relatively small, while the magnitude of harm that their
wrongs produced is exceedingly large. The fact that their culpable conduct has
led to great harm while ours has not may result from nothing other than bad
luck, just as nothing other than bad luck may separate the hurricane sufferer
from the person whom the storm has spared. Only an overly severe or merciless
posture would prompt the thought that they and they alone should bear the cost
of remedying this harm.
In any event, the particular mechanism through which we provide rescue-
i.e., the bailout-shores up a part of the infrastructure crucial to our joint
project. In this way, contributing to the costs of the bailout does more than
fulfill a special obligation to our compatriots; the obligation to contribute also
reflects and reinforces the fact that our fates are tied together. We may not point
31. See, e.g., Jeffrey Friedman, A Perfect Storm of Ignorance, CATo PoL'Y REP., (Jan./Feb. 2010),
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/januaryfebruary-2010/perfect-storm-ignorance; Manav Tanneeru, How
a 'Perfect Storm' Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN.coM, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/
economic.crisis.explainer/ (last visted Mar. 20, 2013); Leon Courville, Financial Crisis: A Perfect Storm
or Regulatory Failure (unpublished manuscript), http://www.hec.ca/iea/seminaires/120508 leon_
courville.pdf.
32. This point may seem to be in tension with my earlier argument that the magnitude of one's
responsibility for some jointly produced wrong does not turn on the number of people with whom one
committed the wrong. The distinction lies, at least in part, at the level of intention: In the earlier
discussion, each participant intended the overall wrong. Here, by contrast, each participant intends only
her own contribution; she does not anticipate that her contribution will interact with the contributions of
others to create the calamity that in fact resulted. And, even if her failure to anticipate the interaction is
itself culpable-because reckless, or at least negligent-this is a far cry, morally speaking, from
intending to bring down the whole system.
33. Cf Joshua D. Margolis, The Responsibility Gap, 11 THE HEDGEHOG REv. 41, 43 (2009) ("[T]he
parade of scandals from Enron to WorldCom, and on to options backdating and sub-prime excesses, all
confirm how easily human beings can glide toward wrong-doing and, sometimes, even march there.").
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a finger in judgment and require our fellows to excuse us from needing to clean
up "their" mess not only because doing so would offend against the relationship
that obtains between us, but also because it would be counterproductive. Just as
in a family or small business the profligate tendencies of one member may on
occasion need to be remedied by the others (with castigation perhaps warranted
but not worthwhile), so too we were required, at least when the economy was
on the brink of collapse, to look to repair, and not to engage in a useless blame
game.
So it is that, at least all else being equal, we do no injustice in recruiting
all taxpayers to fund the bailout. But even while we are licensed in identi-
fying a national obligation to contribute to the bailout, this is not our only
national obligation, and it is precisely because we have been so forcefully
conscripted to fulfill this one while others go unfulfilled that claims of unfair-
ness have merit.
IV. BAILING AND FLAILING
We now know that wealth inequalities contributed in no small part to the
economic crisis. For one thing, growing inequality led to less purchasing power
for those in the lower parts of the income gradients and less aggregate demand
as a result; deflation could be forestalled only by extending easy credit to those
at the bottom.34 Thus, by 2008, debt came to exceed GNP by 33 percent. At
the same time, as the poor became poorer, the rich became richer, amassing
sums of money too vast to spend on consumption alone.3 So those with surplus
income went in search of investment opportunities. The financial intermediaries,
seeing demand for financial products skyrocket, were compelled to come up
with ever-more creative and reckless investment vehicles, "basically throwing
money at anyone who would take it." 3 7 Because the short-term returns on these
investments were high, the rich grew richer still, while middle- and lower-class
wages largely remained stagnant.38 As others have noted, it is perhaps no
coincidence that the greatest inequalities in wealth in the United States were
seen in 1928, at the brink of the Great Depression, and 2007, in the lead-up to
34. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, TOWARDS HUMAN RESILIENCE: SUSTAINING MDG PROGRESS IN AN AGE OF
ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY 188-89 (2011), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undplibrary/Poverty%20
Reduction/TowardsSustainingMDG Webl005.pdf; Stewart Lansley, Inequality, the Crash and the
Crisis. Part 2: A Model of Capitalism that Fails To Share the Fruits of Growth, OECD INSIGHTS
(June 13, 2012), http://oecdinsights.org/2012/06/13/inequality-the-crash-and-the-crisis-part-2-a-model-
of-capitalism-that-fails-to-share-the-fruits-of-growth/.
35. Lansley, supra note 34. Others state that debt exceeded GDP by 100%. See, e.g., Branko
Milanovic, Two Views on the Cause of the Global Crisis-Part I, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (May 4, 2009),
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/two-views-global-crisis.
36. Milanovic, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. STAFF OF JOINT EcoN. COMM., 111TH CONG., INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE GREAT RECESSION 1 (2010),
http//www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File-id=91975589-257c-403b-8093-8f3b584a088c.
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the global financial meltdown.39
Here too, then, we can arrive at an etiology of the crisis that normalizes its
immediate causes: Those who sought to invest weren't intending to dramatically
disrupt the economy; nor were those who sought to serve the investors. But the
inequality in wealth itself raises questions that we have not yet considered.
Traditional defenders of capitalism have recently issued statements arguing
against vast wealth inequalities on prudential grounds. Thus, for example,
Joseph Stiglitz has argued that an "economy in which most citizens are doing
worse year after year-an economy like America's-is not likely to do well
over the long haul," and he urges the wealthiest 1% to attend to the interests of
the 99% not for lofty moral reasons but instead because "paying attention to ...
the common welfare [ ] is in fact a precondition for one's own ultimate
well-being." 40 Similarly, Joseph Bower and co-authors seek to argue that in-
come inequality poses a serious threat to market capitalism, and that govern-
ment and business must seek to redress the inequality in order to stave off
capitalism's demise.4 '
While these are compelling considerations, I want now to raise long-
belabored, but apparently here overlooked, moral grounds for contesting signifi-
cant wealth inequalities.4 2 There is the traditional thought, first articulated by
John Rawls and repeated and refined by his acolytes, that many disparities in
wealth result from luck-differential outcomes in the natural lottery making it
the case that some possess greater shares of the powers to succeed in our society
than others, and differential outcomes in the birth lottery making it the case that
some of us are born into families with greater economic and political power
than others.4 3 If the determinants of wealth result from luck then we cannot be
said to deserve them. And if we do not deserve the determinants of wealth then
we do not deserve the greater wealth that these determinants produce.
In addition to the luck egalitarian objection to wealth disparities, there is a
second line of critique that contests wealth inequalities because and to the
extent that these co-travel with inequalities in social status and political power.
On this line of argument, voiced by Elizabeth Anderson and Michael Walzer
among others,44 what is problematic about inequalities in wealth is not that
39. DAVID A. Moss, BANK FAILURES, REGULATION, AND INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STArEs (2010),
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/BankFailures ChartwithComments
Moss.pdf; see also Louise Story, Income Inequality and Financial Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at
WK5.
40. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR, May 2011, at 2.
41. JOSEPH L. BOWER ET AL., CAPITALISM AT RISK: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF BUSINESS (2011).
42. See generally Xavier Marquez, Is Income Inequality Unjust?: Perspectives from Political
Philosophy, 7 POL. Q. 61 (2011), http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/28ca3580530.pdf.
43. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74-75 (1971); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE
70-74 (2002); G.A. Cohen, The Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989), http://www.
mit.edu/shaslang/mprg/GACohenCEJ.pdf.
44. Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICs 287 (1999), http://philosophy
faculty.ucsd.edulFACULTY/RARNESON/Courses/ElizabethAndersonWhatlsthePointofEquality.pdf;
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
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some individuals get to enjoy finer things than others but instead that those who
have fewer resources may be less capable of pressing their views about political
matters, and they may be subject to the contempt of those who have more as
well.
Finally, there is also a literature connecting greater relative income inequality
in a given society with worse health outcomes for those at the bottom of the
income gradient.45 As one exponent of this line of argument contends, "'the
richer you are, or the higher your occupational status, the longer and healthier
your life."' 4 6 The connection between inequalities in wealth and inequalities in
health has been extensively studied in the United Kingdom, and it has also been
found in every country in the world where it has been measured. 4 7 Most
relevantly, and perhaps most strikingly, for all its wealth, the United States
ranks 5 0 th in the world for life expectancy, alongside the much poorer but also
far more equal countries of Cuba and Costa Rica.48
What is the implication of the critique of wealth inequality for the ethics of
the bailout? As a prudential matter, government intervention aimed at shoring
up the economy must attend to, and seek to diminish, existing inequalities of
wealth, given that these conduce to economic instability, as we have seen. But
more than this, a bailout that lines the pockets of those whom the current
economic regime already favors does more than sustain a currently unjust status
quo. It risks exacerbating the inequality, and waging an additional injury on the
disadvantaged to boot. Their current situation already constitutes a wrong, since
it results from a failure to fulfill the obligations and promise inherent in a
scheme of social cooperation.4 9 In the face of this failure, the zealous efforts to
rescue both Wall Street and Main Street give those who cannot claim residency
in either group-the most economically disempowered, that is-reason to feel
especially slighted. They deserve more and better, and our bailout efforts should
reflect this.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the moral responsibility of those individuals and entities that
played the greatest causal role in precipitating the crisis, we cannot disclaim our
obligations to contribute to its clean up. This is so for several reasons. First,
most of us lent our moral and monetary support to the market structures that
45. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, The Ethics of Health Reform: Why We Should Care About Who is
Missing Coverage, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1058, 1062-65 (2012); Richard G. Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, THE
SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2010). For a summary of earlier
literature in this vein, see Marion Danis & Amy J. Sepinwall, Regulation of the Global Marketplace for
the Sake of Health, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 667 (2002).
46. Daniels, supra note 45, at 1063.
47. Id.; see also M. G. Marmot et al., Employment Grade and Coronary Heart Disease in British
Civil Servants, 32 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 244 (1978); THE SOCIETY AND POPULATION HEALTH
READER: INCOME INEQUALITY AND HEALTH xxii-xxiv (Ichiro Kawachi et al. eds., 1999).
48. Daniels, supra note 45, at 1062; Danis & Sepinwall, supra note 45, at 3.
49. Cf IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE (2011).
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allowed for excessive risk-taking and thereby brought the economy to the brink
of collapse. Second, even those of us who conducted our financial affairs with
the utmost care likely cannot claim the kind of moral purity that would license
our imposing the bailout costs exclusively on investors and borrowers. And,
finally, even if we could genuinely lay claim to moral superiority, we would still
have obligations to contribute to the bailout, because our shared membership in
the polity demands no less. For all of these reasons, we may not rage against our
conscripted involvement in the bailout.
At the same time, we can and should ensure that those who are "bailed out"
include not only those who are flailing as a result of the crisis, but also those
whose welfare we have neglected for too long, and whose claims on the
national fisc may well be even more meritorious than are those of the bailout's
most visible targets.
